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(the 11th year of SHOWA)

Report on the China Situation No. 22

On the SIAN Incident

General Staff Office

#### 1. Outline of the Incident

Chang Hsueh-lian arrested and imprisoned CHIANG Kai-shek at the HUACHING CHIH Hot Springs at 3:00 A.M. December 12, 1936, detaining at the same time several important Central Government men including CHEN Cheng, CHIANG Ting-wen, CHEN Tiao-Yuan, CHU Shao-liang, CHIEN Ta-chun, SHAO Li-tzu and others, and then sent a telegram to the NANKING Government demanding:

(1) national salvation by resisting Japan; (2) alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and admittance of Communism; (3) suspension of the punitive campaign against the Communist Army; and (4) reorganization of the National Government. It is also reported that CHIANG Kai-shek was arrested when he was scheduled to leave by plane on the 12th having known Chang Hsueh-lian's intrigue beforehand.

It seems that the leader directly responsible was LIU To-chuan, Chief of Chang Hsueh-liang's Guard Troops (former commander of the 105th Division). The facts of CHIANG and others is still unknown.

It can be said that China, which is on the way to national unity, is again been thrown into confusion by this incident. It appears that this was not planned and carried out by Chang Hsueh-liang alone but the YANG Hu-cheng also has complicity in it. Furthermore, there are indications that there are many conspirators in the NANKING Government, the principal ones being FENG Yu-hsiang, LI Lieh-chun and CHANG Chi, and it is further said that Yu Yu-jen, SUN Fo and SUNG Tzu-wen (T.V. Soong) are also in collusion with the plot. There is also a rumour that 7 champions of the National Salvation League of the Entire Nation and all-circles, including CHANG Nai-chi and others, who previously were arrested as the result of suppression of anti-Japanese and anti-CHIANG movements, will soon be released to spur on anti-Japanese and Communistic movements. Moreover, a section of persons in important positions in the NANKING Government regard this incident as resulting from CHIANG Kai-shek's insufficient knowledge of the former North-Eastern Army and have come to have less confidence in CHIANG, giving rise to an anti-CHIANG feeling within the Government. The situation has now been brought about where the NANKING Government which outwardly

seemed united under CHIANG Kai-shek's dictatorship may again be broken up into various factions and is proceeding in the direction desired by them.

## 2. Cause of the Incident.

In probing into the cause of this incident, it is difficult to get at the real truth whether CHANG Hsueh-liang plans to become the vanguard of the army to fight against Japan, being dissatisfied with CHIANG Kai-shek's attitude toward Japan and at the instigation of the U.S.S.R., or whether he desires to take the initiative in the anti-CHIANG movement in order to recover his own influence which has gradually been reduced since the Manchurian Incident. He was driven beyond the Great Wall by the Japanese forces following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and his views with regard to recovery were not accepted by CHIANG Kai-shek so that finally his entire army was forced to withdraw within the Great Wall. For a while he was in north China as chairman of the Peiping Branch of the Military Council but called incompetent by the people as soon as fighting began in Jehol and this being more than he could bear, he exiled himself abroad. Six months later, in January, 1934, after things had calmed down within the country, he returned to Shanghai, but the only thing which awaited him was Chiang Kai-shek's commission appointing him Deputy Commander of the Pandit Extermination Army at HANKOW. There was no sign of his cherished ambition to recover the lost north-eastern territory being heeded at all. However, he could do nothing against CHIANG who was then at the height of his power.

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In compliance with CHANG's order he had to go to HANKOW, and thus began his career of bandit extermination. Thereafter, he fought for two years in one place after another in pursuit of roving communist bandits, and was finally forced to confine himself in the remote north west as he pursued the Communists in their northward flight. Meanwhile, military funds not being sufficiently supplied by the Central Government, many of his subordinates left him day after day and his influence gradually waned. While he was thus in a state of disquiet CHIANG started to reorganize CHANG's declining forces by further reducing of his men under the pretext of coordinating the military affairs of the entire country. Chang Hsueh-liang, son of the CHANG family, which once boasted of a military strength of 300,000 men as a king of Manchuria and whose control extended over seven provinces, was now sustaining his life as just another war lord with a greatly reduced force of only 100,000 men in a remote district where there were no food or houses to be had, carrying the favour of dictator CHIANG Kai-shek, who held his fate completely in his hand. Anybody, if not Chang Hsueh-liang, would have complained of such a plight, feeling dissatisfaction and discontent.

As a result of successive years of contact with the Communist forces, Chang Hsueh-liang's forces which were in a state of despair, indignation, and fear on account of defeats

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were easily saturated by skilful Communist propaganda, and especially, as the extreme leftists among Chang Hsueh-liang's entourage gradually became more active, the majority of the junior officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or less who were the mainstay of his forces, seemed to have turned red. It is reported that these Communist elements counseled Chang Hsueh-liang to demand Chiang Kai-shek to declare war immediately against Japan and on this pretext to imprison CHIANG when he came to SIAM at the end of last October, but, pacified by Chang Hsueh-liang, they finally gave up this plan. According to another version Chang Hsueh-liang had been in contact with the U.S.S.R. through CHENG Shih-tssai of SINGKIANG since six months ago, kept in touch with PENG Yu-hsiang, Yu Yu-jen, TENG Wen-i, Ho Chung-Han and TSAI Lung (Commander of the assassination unit compromised with the Communist forces, making a part of NINGSIA a communist base and planned to complete the construction of the international route, and that in so doing he merely pretended to be fighting the communists as an excuse. Therefore, it may be regarded as a fact that Commander Chang Hsueh-liang and the inner circle of his forces have been considerably Communized. It appears reasonable to regard the present incident as having been started with considerable determination to steal the march on Chiang Kai-shek by catching him off guard as the result of their accumulated discontent and Bolshvization and they did so taking advantage of the appointment of CHIANG Jing-wen as Commander-in-chief of the Front Line Bandits

Extermination Army and a rumour of the transfer of the forces to SUIYUAN or FUKIEN, utilizing as excuses such facts as China's rejection at the Nanking negotiations of the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence against Communism, the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese movement throughout the country in connection with the SUIYUAN question, the transfer of the central forces near SIAN, and the losses sustained in fighting bandits by the 1st Division which was regarded as the very pick of the Chinese forces.

3. Attitude of the Nanking Government.

The NANKING Government, which was informed about CHANG Hsueh-Liang's military rebellion for the first time at 3 p.m. on the 12th, was greatly dismayed and immediately dispatched an aerial reconnaissance Squad to SIAN to ascertain the true situation. Upon receipt at 11 p.m. of a definite report that CHIANG Kai-Shek was under detention, an Extraordinary Joint Conference of the Standing and Political Councils was hurriedly called and matters as given below were decided. Also as a means to get Chiang Kai-shek's release it was decided to dispatch his personal advisor DONALD and others to SIAN and have them negotiate with Cheng Hsueh-Liang.

Items decided at the Extraordinary Conference

- 1) KUNG HSIANG-HSI shall take charge as president of the Executive YUAN.
- 2) The Standing Committee of the Military Council shall be



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increased from 5 to 7, and HO YING-CHIN, CHENG CHIH, LI LIEH-CHUN, CHU PEI-TE, FENG YU-HSIANG, TANG SHENG-CHIH and CHEN SHAO-KUAN shall be appointed as members.

3) The Military Council shall be placed under the supervision of FENG, Vice Chairman, and the above-mentioned Standing Committee with full responsibility.

4) HO YING-CHIN, Minister of War, shall assume control of the mobile units.

5) CHANG HSUEH-LIANG shall be divested of his regular and concurrently held positions and shall be subject to severe punishment by the Military Council. The troops under CHANG HSUEH-LIANG shall be placed under the direct command of the Military Council.

Although the above-mentioned decisions appear to show a notably high recognition of the authority of WUNG HSING-HSI and HO YINGCHIN, subversive activities of the Pro-Soviet faction, including FENG YUH-SIANG, still remain unabated, and even after the commencement of the Central Army's punitive actions, they came to a compromise with CHANG HSUEH-LIANG under the pretext of rescuing CHIANG Kai-SHEK. These schemers suspended mopping up operations against bandits, having accepted CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's contentions and insisted on waging war against Japan in cooperation with CHANG HSUEH-LIANG. For this end FENG himself flew to SIAM and in an attempt to negotiate with CHANG HSUEH-LIANG. As they seem to be taking an entirely opposite attitude, judging from all these actions

their activities in the future need be closely watched.

4. Commencement of Actions by the Central Army.

As is shown in the afore-mentioned decisions at the extraordinary Conference of the NANKING Government inasmuch as once a decision was made by the central authorities to mete out a severe punishment to CHANG HSUEH-LIANG. The Military Council considered that a decree for punitive action need not be specially issued and immediately ordered the Central Army to go into action. Accordingly one infantry corps and an artillery unit, belonging to the specially trained forces of the NANKING Military Academy, which constituted the crack troops of the Central Army, were dispatched to SIAM and simultaneously, 3 divisions, garrisoning LOYANG, were sent to the vicinity of Tungkwan, 3 divisions at LIUCHIH were made to proceed to the vicinity of LOYANG, as 2nd line forces, and several airplane units seem to have been transferred to LOYANG. In SIAM, however, immediately upon the outbreak of the incident, 60 of the body Guard Unit, of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, were killed and 30 wounded, rest being taken prisoners. All the main forces of the Guard Unit, which were within the walls of the city, were also dispersed. Twenty-one airplanes of the 2nd Air Company which were at the airfield as well as the 6 planes which flew from NANKING on the 12th seem to have been seized by CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's army. Moreover, it is reported that HU TSUNG-CHAN's army in the eastern part of KANSU clashed



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with the YU HSUEH-CHUNG's army on the 12th and entered LIN-HOW on the 13th.

In opposition to this, CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's army totally suspended mopping up operations against the bandits since about the 9th and its main forces seem to have been concentrating in the north and north-west of SIEN. At the time of the incident there was in the vicinity of SIEN only the 105th Division of CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's Army, besides 2 or 3 corps of KANG HUCHENG's Army. Another portion of CHANG HSUEH LIANG's army (including one infantry corps and upward of 10 pieces of artillery), immediately after the incident tried to prevent the advance of the Central Army by occupying adjacent areas of Tungk Wan but was defeated by TAN YAO-HUANG's army on the night of the 18th, and the greater part of the troops is said to have been taken prisoner.

YU HSUEH CHUNG is said to have established in HSIANNAN YULIN the PAOHUNG Army General Headquarters, formerly the North-west Bandit-Extirmination Army General Headquarters.

#### B. Attitude of War-Lords in Various Areas

It is difficult to pass any judgment at this moment as to the attitude of the war-lords in various areas but the situation as it has become clear up to now is as follows:

##### 1) KWANGTUNG

Yu Han-zeu and HUNG Mu-sung promptly sent a telegram to the central government under joint signatures to the effect

that they would support the central government and maintain local peace and order, but the observation is that Yu Han-Mou's true intention is to watch the course of developments.

2) KWANGSI

Suspecting the LI Tsung-jen and PAI Chung-hsi are involved in this incident, HO Ying-chin seems to have asked for their opinions on the 13th; but they have not expressed their minds yet. However it is rumored that their deputy CHANG Jen-Min met LIU Hsiang, HO Chien and others at HONGKONG, and discussed about starting a movement to support CHANG Hsueh-liang in opposition to CHIANG Kai-shek.

3) Hepei Chahar

On the night of the 13th, SUNG Cho-vuan ordered war-lords in various districts to assemble at PAIPING. It seems that as a result of the conference held at NANYUAN on the 14th a resolution was adopted that the Hepei-Chahar government should strengthen its stand for defence of frontiers and keeping the people's mind at rest by vigorously carrying out the policy of anti-communism and of promoting Sino-Japanese collaboration. There seems to be no change in the attitude of WAN Fu-lin toward the Hepei-chahar regime.

4) SHANSI

Having decided its own attitude the Hepei-Chahar regime proposed to SHANTUNG and SHANSI to take the same step and it is said that although a telegraphic answer from Shantung was

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received shortly afterward, no answer was received from SHANSI until the 15th. Though YEN Hsi-shan's attitude is still unknown, it seems that he has ordered his main forces which had been sent to the northern SHANSI and SUICHU area to return to the place, east of YILYU where they were previously stationed for defense.

5) SHANTUNG

HAN Fu-chu seems at present to be watching the situation judging that the future of the situation unpredictable and it is considered that he will, for some time, continue his present attitude of advocating defence of frontiers and keeping the people's mind at ease.

6) SZECHWAN and HUNAN

Concerning the attitude of LIU Hsiang and HO Chiao, nothing definite is known yet. However, in view of the fact that they have always been oppressed being deprived by CHIANG Kai-shek of their spheres of influence and their troops and that, LIU Hsiang was expelled from his base and ordered to move out to HUPAI, and further more in the light of the fact that there is a rumour as mentioned above that they held an anti-CHIANG Kai-shek conference with the representatives of KWANGSI, it is not difficult to suppose that they are at least sailing along themselves with pleasure even though they may not rise in support of CHANG Hsueh-liang.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 12 pages and entitled "On the SILN Incident" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 12th day of March, 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru  
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: URAGE, Katsuma  
(seal)

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支那時報第二十二號  
西安事件ニ就テ

秘

昭和十一年十二月十六日

參謀本部

一、事件ノ概要

昭和十一年十二月十二日午前三時張學良ハ蔣介石ヲ西安東方華清池  
溫泉ニ逮捕監禁スルト共ニ陳誠、蔣鼎文、陳調元、朱紹良、錢大鈞、  
邵力子等數名ノ中央系要人ヲモ抑留シ且南京政府ニ向ヒ

一、抗日救國

二、聯蘇容共

三、共產軍討伐中止

四、國民政府ノ改組

等ヲ要求セル通電ヲ發セリ

而シテ蔣介石ハ豫メ學良ノ企圖ヲ察知シ十二日飛行機ニテ退去ノ豫  
定ナリシ所ヲ逮捕セラレタルモノナリトモ傳ヘラレ之カ直接首謀者  
ハ學良ノ衛隊長劉多荃（前第一百五師長）ナルモノノ如ク蔣以下ノ生  
死ハ未タ判明スルニ至ラス

本事件ハ統一途上ニアル支那ヲシテ再ヒ混亂ノ渦中ニ投セシモノト



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謂フヲ得ヘク其事ハ學良單獨ノ計畫爲ニアラスシテ湯虎城等モ加  
邊シアルカ如ク又南京政府中ニモ相當多數ノ策謀者アル模様ニシテ  
其主ナル者ハ馮玉祥、李烈鈞、張作霖ノ三名ト謂ハレ尙干右丞、孫科  
宋子文等モ之ニ呼應ヲ通シアリシト稱セラレ義ニ抗日反蔣運動彈壓  
ノ事檢察セラレシ全盟各界救國聯合會ノ關士章乃器等七名ハ近ク蘇州ノ上  
抗日赤化運動ニ拘執ヲ蒙クヘシトノ噂モアリ又南京政府要路ノ一部ニ  
ハ本事件ハ蔣介石ノ喜望北軍ニ盡スル認識不足ニ基因スルモノトシ  
テ蔣ノ信用ヲ減シ政府内部ヨリ反蔣氣勢燃揚ラントスルノ氣運ヲ示  
シ蔣介石ノ猶豫ニ依リ外國統一サレシ南京政府モ茲ニ再ヒ各派ニ分  
裂シ其欲スル所ニ赴カントスルノ形勢ヲ示スニ至レリ

## 二、事件ノ原因

今本事件ノ原因ヲ探究スルニ學良カ蔣介石ノ變日態度ヲ飽キ足  
ラストシ蔣介石ノ下ニ抗日ノ先導ヲ企圖セシヤ或ハ清洲事變以

來日々縮減セラレ行ク自己勢力挽回ノ爲反蔣運動ノ魁タラントセシ  
 モノナリヤ等其眞相捕提シ難キモ彼トシテハ滿洲事變勃發ト共ニ日  
 本軍ノ蒙關外ニ進逐セラレ之カ恢復意見ハ蔣ノ容ルル所トナラス遂  
 ニ全蒙關外撤退ノ餘儀ナキニ至リ一時北平軍事分會委員長トシテ北  
 支ニ駐セシモ熱河戰始マルヤ國民ヨリ無能呼ハハリサレ遂ニ居タタ  
 マラスシテ海外ニ亡命セリ其後約半歲昭和九年一月國內ノ熱リ漸ヤ  
 ク冷ムルヲ待チ上海ニ歸還セシモ彼ヲ待チアリシモノハ蔣介石ノ一  
 片ノ薄口ニヤケル劇變副司令任命ノ辭令ニシテ彼ノ夢寐ニモ忘レ得  
 ヌ東北失地ノ恢復ノ如キハ片鱗タモ遺フヲ得サリシナリ  
 然レトモ當時旭日昇天ノ勢ニアル蔣ニ對シテハ如何トモスル能ハス  
 已ムナク其命ニ從ヒ漢口ニ赴キシカ茲ニ彼ノ剿匪生活ノ第一歩ハ始  
 マリシナリ爾來約二年流浪スル共匪ノ行動ニ伴ヒ各地ニ轉戦シ終ニ  
 ハ共產軍ノ北上ニ伴ヒ之ヲ逐フテ西北ノ一隅ニ到リ貧賤ノ局地ニ逼  
 息ヲ餘儀ナクセラレ中間中央ヨリノ爲費ハ十分支給セラレス部下ノ

多クハ日ト共ニ減シ其勢力ハ漸次ニ薄ラキ心中既ニ穩カナラサリシ  
時更ニ蔣ハ全國ノ軍事統制ニ名ヲ藉リ此ノ衰減セル軍ヲ一層縮少ス  
ヘク之カ改組ニ着手セリ一時ハ滿洲ノ王者トシテ兵力三十萬ヲ擁シ  
其威令七省ニ及ビシ張家ノ御曹子早良、今ヤ其兵力八十萬ニ削減セ  
ラレ喰フニ物無ク住ムニ家無キ邊陲ノ一隅ニ單ニ一介ノ軍閥トシテ  
生命ヲ保チ獨裁者蔣介石ノ鼻息ヲ窺ヒ聲ヲ拂ヒ其一舉一笑ニ由  
リ自己ノ運命ヲ決セラルルニ至ル 誰カ早良ナラスト雖自己ノ不  
運ヲ託チ不平、不運ヲ生セサルモノアランヤ

而シテ亦連年ノ共產黨トノ接觸ニ因リ其巧妙ナル宣傳ハ失意憤怨且  
敗戦ニ因ル恐怖心ヲ有シアル軍ノ内部ニ容易ニ浸潤シ殊ニ早良左右  
ノ極左分子ノ活動漸次活氣ヲ呈シ爲ニ同軍ハ中佐級以下中堅下級幹  
部ノ大部赤化シアリシ如ク此等赤化分子ハ去ル十月末蔣カ西安ニ來  
リシ時早良ニ對シ即時ニ日關聯ヲ要求シ之カ口實トシテ蔣ヲ監視ス  
ヘキヲ申言セシモ蔣ハ之ヲ拒絶ニ因リ漸ヤク中止シタル事實モ有リト

親シ又一説ニハ華良自身既ニ半年前ヨリ新疆ノ盛世オヲ通シテ蘇邦  
ト連絡シ且馮玉祥、干右壬、鄧文儀、賀良宗、段龍（暗殺隊長）等  
ト氣脈ヲ通シ共產黨ト妥協シ寧夏ノ一部ヲ以テ共產黨ノ根據地トナ  
シ國際路線ノ完成ヲ企圖シ剿匪ハ單ニ申請的行動ヲ行ヒアリシニ過  
キストモ稱セラレアレハ華良ハ御大學良ヲ始メニ内部迄相當赤  
化シアリシハ華良トルヲ得ヘク此等不平不義並赤化ノ變遷力蔣鼎  
文ノ國北剿匪前敵總司令任命及華良ノ綏遠又ハ華良駐紮無ヲ得トシ  
且南京交渉ニ於ケル支那側ノ日支協同防共ノ拒否、綏遠問題ニ於ケ  
ル各方的抗日氣分ノ擡頭、二安附近中央軍ノ移駐並支那軍中有敵ノ  
精銳部隊ト目サルル第一師ノ剿匪ニ因ル損害等ヲ利用シ蔣介石ノ虛  
隙ニ乘シ遂先ヲ制シ相當ノ決意ノ許ニ達ニ今次ノ舉ニ出テシト云ル  
ヲ至當トスルカ如シ

### 三、南京政府ノ態度

南京政府ハ十二日午後三時ニ至リ始メテ學良兵變ノ報ニ接スルヤ大  
 イニ狼狽シ直チニ偵察飛行隊ヲシテ西安ニ到リ實情ヲ確メシカ午後  
 十一時蔣介石暨蔡ノ電報ニ接スルヤ急遽臨時常務及政治委員聯席會  
 議ヲ召集シ左記事項ヲ決議シ且蔣介石ノ救出ヲ策シ彼ノ顧問  
 ドナ  
 ルド 等ヲ西安ニ派遣シ學良ト折衝セシムルニ決セリ

#### 臨時會議決議事項

一 行政院ハ孔祥熙院長ノ職務ヲ行フ  
 二 軍事委員會常務委員ハ徐來ノ五名ヲ七名トシ何應欽、程潛、李烈  
 鈞、朱培德、湯玉祥、宮生智、陳綏寬ヲ之ニ任命ス  
 三 軍事委員會ハ陸訓委員長及前記常務委員責ヲ負ヒ之ヲ辦理ス  
 四 移動軍隊ノ指揮ニ關シテハ軍事部長何應欽之ヲ辦理ス  
 五 學良ハ本兼各職ヲ統率シ軍事委員會ニテ懲罰ニ附シ其指揮下ノ  
 軍隊ハ軍事委員會直接之ヲ指揮ス  
 而シテ右決議ハ孔祥熙及何應欽ノ權力ヲ著シク認メタルモノナリト

雖馮玉祥始メ聯蘇派ノ策動ハ依然トシテ止マス中央軍ノ討伐行動開始後ニ於テモ之ニ反動シ蔣介石ノ助命ヲ乞トシ張學良ト妥協シ而モ其主張ヲ容レ剿匪ヲ中止シ相協力シテ數日戰爭ヲ開始センコトヲ主張シ或ハ馮自身西安ニ飛ヒ學良ト折衝セントスル等悉ク反動的態度ニ出テアル模様ナレハ今後ニ於ケル彼等ノ行動ハ最モ注目ヲ要スル所ナリトス

#### 四、中央軍ノ行動開始

前記南京政府臨時會議ノ決議ノ如ク中央ニ於テ學良ヲ懲罰ニ附スヘク決定シタル以上軍事委員會ハ時ニ討伐令ノ發布ヲ要セストシ直チニ中央軍ニ行動開始ヲ命シ且最精銳部隊タル南京軍官學校教導總隊步兵一團及砲兵一營ヲ西安ニ派遣スルト共ニ洛陽駐防ノ三箇師ヲ關附近ニ又劉峙ノ三箇師ヲ第二線トシテ洛陽附近ニ前進セシメ且飛行隊若干ヲ洛陽ニ移動セシメタルカ如キモ西安ニ於テハ事件勃發ト



共ニ蘇介石ノ側近ニ在リシ者ハ六十名既死シ三十名負傷シ他ハ悉ク捕縛トナリ城内ニ在リシ其主力モ悉ク武装ヲ解除セラレ又飛行場ニ在リシ飛行二中隊二十一機並十二日南京ヨリ飛ビシ六機ハ共ニ蘇良軍ノ機銃ヲセラレタルモノノ如シ  
尙甘肅省ニ在リシ胡宗南軍ハ十二日于寧忠軍ト衝突シ十三日蘭州ニ入レリト傳ヘラル

之ニ對スル蘇良軍ハ去ル九日頃ヨリ全ク剿匪ヲ中止シ其主力ハ固寧北方及甘肅北方ニ集中ナリシモノノ如ク西安附近ニハ蘇良軍當時其部五師及別ニ楊虎城軍ノ二、三團アリシニ過キス蘇良軍ノ他ノ一部（歩兵一團砲十數門）ハ蘇良軍直轄部隊附近ヲ占領シ中央軍ノ前進ヲ阻止セントシタルモ十三日夜萬壽橋蘇軍ノ機銃ヲセラレ其大部ハ俘虜トナリタリト傳セラル又平津忠ハ西安南院ニ駐西北軍總司令部係紅軍總司令部ヲ開設セリト報ハル

五、各地將領ノ態度

各地將領ノ態度ニ就シテハ今迄ニ全部ヲ判定シ難キモ現在迄ニ判明セルモノノ狀況左ノ如シ

一、廣 東

余道長及黃慕松ハ十三日迄早ク道名ニテ中央宛中央根據地方治安維持ノ通牒ヲ發セルモ余道長ノ真意ハ形勢觀望ニ在ルモノト觀察セラレアリ

二、廣 西

本次事件ハ李宗仁、白崇禧トモ連絡アリトノ疑アリシヲ以テ何應欽ハ十三日之ニ向ヒ意見ヲ徴シタルカ如キモ彼等ハ今ニ至ルモ何等ノ意志ヲ表示セス但其代表張任民ハ香港ニ於テ劉湘、何健等ト會見シ蔣委員長反蔣運動勸告ヲ協議セリト噂セララル

三、雲 南

宋哲元ハ十三日迄各地將領ニ北平集合ヲ命シ十四日南苑ニ於テ會

議シタル結果冀察政權トシテ今後一層保境安民ヲ趣旨トシ防共政策ヲ徹底シ日支提携ヲ圖ルヘキヲ決議シタルカ如ク萬福麟亦冀察政權ニ對スル從來ノ態度ニ變化ナキカ如シ

#### 四 山 西

冀察側ハ自己ノ態度ヲ決定スルヤ山東並山西ニ同一步調ヲ取ルヘキヲ提議シタル所山東ヨリハ直チニ返電ニ接セシモ山西ヨリハ十五日ニ至ルモ何等ノ返事ナシト謂ヒ閻錫山ノ態度ハ尙不明ナルモ綏遠事件ニ由リ山西北部及綏遠方面ニ派遣シアリシ軍隊ノ主力ハ太原以南駐屯防地ニ復歸ヲ命シタルモノノ如シ

#### 五 山 東

韓復榘ハ爾後ノ推移未タ知ルヘカラストシ目下形勢ヲ觀望中ナルモノノ如ク茲當分ハ保境安民ヲ標榜シ此態度ヲ持續スルモノト判斷セラル

#### 六 四 川、湖 南

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劉湘、何鍵等ノ態度ニ關シテハ未タ明カナラサルモ從來蔣介石ヨ  
リ悉ク壓迫セラレ其地盤ハ奪ハレ軍隊ハ取り上ケラレ況ヘ劉湘ノ  
如キハ最近自己ノ根據地ヲ逐ハレ湖北ニ移動ヲ命セラレシ程ニシ  
テ而モ前記廣西ノ項ニ述ヘシ如ク廣西代表ト反蔣會議ヲ行ヒシ噂  
アル程ナレハ假令學良ヲ擁護シテ起タスト雖少クモ本回ノ舉ニ快  
心ノ笑ヲ洩シアルハ察スルニ難カラス